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CREATION, REDEMPTION AND VIRTUE
Caleb Miller

In this paper, I defend the claim that Christian theology gives us good reason
to think that virhle is relati\'e to individuals and communities, i.e., that what
character traits are virtues for individuals is relative to individuals and to the
communities of which they are members. I begin by reviewing the theological
claims that I take to be relevant. I then argue that these claims make it plausible to conclude that virtue is morally redemptive and therefore relative to individuals and communities. I then seek to use these conclusions to illuminate
the discussion of the correctiveness of virtue. Finally I respond to some objections and suggest some further ways that my views could be developed.

I. Theological Background

God, according to Christian theology, created humanity. Moreover, he created humanity in order for human beings to fulfill the purposes for which
he created humanity. Taken together, I am assuming, these purposes constihlte the human telos, the fulfillment of which would constitute achievement of the human good. The primary purpose for which human beings
were created is to love God. Part of what it is for human beings to love
God is for them to love each other. The good human being, i.e., the person
whose life fulfilled her telos, would have a character that disposed her to
live only in ways consistent with the love of God and the love of other
human beings.
Human sin, however, has seriously undermined the achievement of
those purposes. It has done so in two ways. It has directly undermined
the achievement of our telos in that human sin is constituted by a refusal to
cooperate with God's purposes for humanity. Secondly, it has undermined the fulfillment of our purpose by so corrupting human nature that
we have become incapable of achieving God's purposes for us. That is,
human character has become so deficient that human beings, in the grip of
sin, are incapable of living a life characterized by the love of God and the
love of others. Redemption is God's effort to save humanity from sin. This
effort is most centrally, I suggest, an effort to restore human life to the love
of God and others. Redemption includes, of course, the offer of forgiveness in Christ and the gift of eternal life. But it also includes God's effort to
transform human beings into people who love God and love their fellow
human beings, i.e., to become people who fulfill the human telos.
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II. The Redemptiveness of Virtue

Morality, I suggest, is intended by God to increase the degree to which we
fulfill the purpose for which God created us, or, alternatively, the degree to
which we fulfill our telos. Following Aristotle, I suggest that virtue is "the
state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his
own work well." (Nicomachean Ethics, 1106') Virtue is then the state of
character that improves the degree to which our lives approximate the life
for which God created humanity.l Virtues are character traits which
improve our conformity to our telos. This much I take to be fairly typical of
those who have sought to think about virtue from a Christian perspective.
Indeed, except for the theistic interpretation of the human telos, it is consistent with Aristotle's account of virtue. What is missing from such a generic understanding of the relationship of human nature to virtue is an appreciation of human fallenness. More specifically, such an understanding typically overlooks the fact that the character of fallen human beings is
deformed by sin and that the deformity of human character leaves human
beings morally incapacitated. As such, human character is not only in
need of maturity and perfection, it is in need of restoration, particularly the
restoration of moral capacities. Given human depravity, human fulfillment
is human redemption. I suggest, therefore, that morality is intended by
God to redeem humanity, i.e., to restore humanity to the life for which he
created us and from which we are fallen by sin. In particular, I suggest
that virtues are those character traits which contribute to our redemption.
More precisely they are those character traits that are best suited to overcoming the impediments of sin to the fulfillment of our telos. 2 In what follows, I shall develop the implications of this suggestion and defend it
along the way.
III. Redemption and the Relativity of Virtue

Martha Nussbaum has pointed out an interesting difference between the
virtue ethics of Aristotle and that of his twentieth century admirers. Unlike
Aristotle, twentieth century defenders of virtue ethics" as otherwise diverse
as Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams and Philippa Foot" are relativists
when it comes to virtue. 3 According to Nussbaum, Aristotle accepted and
these relativists deny the correctness "of a single objective account of the
human good, or human flourishing,"4 and the correctness of a single "list of
virtues that will serve as normative for all ... societies. u5 Nussbaum seems
to assume that these two differences between Aristotle and relativist virtue
theorists are inextricably linked to each other, i.e., that relativism with
respect to the human good requires relativism with respect to virtue, and
vice versa, and similarly that absolutism with respect to one of these issues
requires absolutism with respect to the other. Indeed, she seems to treat
these two differences as alternative characterizations of the same difference.
She therefore defends the existence of a single objectively correct account of
the human good, by arguing that there is a single objectively correct list of
human virtues. But it is not at all obvious that these two different claims are
as inextricably connected as Nussbaum takes them to be. Indeed, I shall
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argue, an appreciation of the fact that virtue is redemptive gives us reason
to accept relativism, in Nussbaum's sense, with respect to virtue, and to
reject relativism with respect to the human good or telos.
Let us assume what I have already claimed, viz., that the human good
consists in fulfilling the purposes for which God created us, and the actions
and character traits that fulfill those purposes are respectively those that
express, and dispose us to, the love of God and others. For the sake of argument, assume that excellence of character comes in degrees ranging from
zero to ten. A person with a character rating of ten would be precisely disposed to live perfectly in accordance with her telos, whereas a person with a
character rating of zero would be disposed to live life entirely in opposition
to her telos. One way to think about virtue is to hold that virtues are all and
only those character traits that the person with a character rating of ten
would have. After all, what character traits would be better suited to satisfying Aristotle's requirement that virtues make a person good and make
him do his own work well? But that way of thinking about what makes us
good considers only our telos. It fails to take into account our fallenness.
The traits that are best suited to improving the character and actions of a
person with a character rating of four might be quite different from those
that would guide the actions of a person whose character were perfect.
In order to defend that claim, I need to spell out some assumptions I am
making about human moral psychology. Although I shall not defend these
assumptions, I intend them to be plausible, independently of the use I make
of them. A character trait, I am assuming, is a disposition to act in some
particular way. Dispositions to act are dispositions to intentional behavior.
These dispositions are constituted by such factors as beliefs, desires, commitments and psychological tendencies. A person's character is the set of
all such dispositions of that person. The character of a community is the set
of all such dispositions in the members of that community. I am assuming
that character traits are acquired and sustained, in large part, by habituation
and by social influence. In other words, acting in some particular way reinforces the disposition to act in that way. Other things being equal, the more
frequently one acts in that way, the more strongly such actions reinforce the
corresponding dispositions. The dispositions of an individual are also
strongly influenced by the actions, character and commitments of the other
members of the communities to which that person belongs. Much more
could fruitfully be said about how character and action causally relate to
each other, but these general comments will be enough for me to defend the
claim that virtue is relative to communities and individuals.
Let me illustrate by considering one of the teachings of Jesus. In the
Sermon on the Mount, Jesus said, "You have heard that it was said, 'Eye
for eye, and tooth for tooth.' but I tell you, Do not resist an evil person.""
and later "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, ... //7
It is interesting that the precept with which Jesus contrasts his teaching is
quoted directly from the Old Testament, which Jesus manifestly took to be
the Word of God. Arthur Holmes offers a fairly standard explanation for
the existence of this requirement of the Old Testament Law. "In the
ancient near East, ... vastly disproportionate punishments were often the
practice. The Old Testament Law insists on a proportionate response to evil
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and limits society's use of force."s Against that background, proportionate
retribution was closer to the ideal of love for one's fellow human beings.
In that context, the effect of the "eye for eye" rule was to limit the degree to
which actions were opposed to the love of others. But, in the spirit of
encouraging the love of others, Jesus asks his followers to go beyond limiting one's retaliation. He asks them rather to do just what the love of others
would require, i.e., to seek what is good for others, regardless of the harm
that they have done to the agent.
Why, then, would God prescribe" an eye for an eye," for the members of
an ancient near Eastern culture? The practice of "an eye for an eye" would
improve the degree to which the lives of those who would have otherwise
been inclined to disproportional retaliation are conformed to the human
telos. It would also improve, by habituation, the character of those who
would otherwise be disposed to disproportionate retaliation by replacing
that disposition with one more closely approximating the disposition to
treat others according to love. The more rigorous requirement of unconditionallove, to which Jesus called his followers, would improve, in these two
ways, the conformity to the love of God and others of those otherwise disposed to proportionate retribution. But we are still left with a question, Why
would it not have been better for God to have instructed his ancient Near
Eastern people to follow the ideal standard of unconditional love? A plausible answer to that question is, I think, that the practices that would have
been required to cultivate and sustain the character trait of unconditional
love were not, given the character of ancient Israel, practices to which they
could constructively aspire. 9 They were not, in other words, practices to
which they could aspire in a way that would tend to improve their conformity to the love of others. That was true, I suspect, either because their
character left them incapable of genuinely aspiring to practices so strongly
opposed to their dispositions, or because their character left them incapable
of improving by such aspiration the degree to which they achieved that
standard. If they had regarded unconditional love as a standard to which
they were subject when it was utterly beyond their moral capacities to meet
it, it would only have discouraged them from the project of improving their
lives morally, and habituated them to the violation of their moral standards.
If all that is true, then the disposition (let us call it "reciprocity") to treat others as one has been treated by them, was redemptive for the citizens of
ancient Israel. It was a character trait that tended to transform their lives
and their character in the direction of the love of God and others. Because it
was redemptive for them, it was a virtue for them, i.e., it tended to make
them good and to make them to do their own work well.
However, the character of the followers of Jesus is, or should be, such
that they can constructively aspire to the standard of unconditionallove.lO
For us, unconditional love is a virtue and reciprocity is a vice, a disposition
to treat others in ways that violate unconditional love for them. It is even
conceivable that the character of a community is such that a disposition (let
us call it "vindictiveness") to retaliate disproportionately against wrongdoers would serve to improve the life and character of its members by reinforcing an otherwise deficient repugnance for, and avoidance of, wrong
actions. It is conceivable then that vindictiveness would have therefore
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been a virtue for the members of such a community despite the fact that it
was a vice for the ancient Israelites and for Christian believers.
Whatever the plausibility of these particular claims about these particular communities and conceivable communities, I hope I have at least illustrated how what is virtuous for a person can depend on what is redemptive for that person, and that what is redemptive for her can depend on the
particular degree and type of corruption from which her character, and
that of her community, suffers.
The illustration that I have offered is one in which the relevant character
differences existed between communities separated by time. But there is
nothing essentially temporal about such differences. This is not the place
to pursue it, but the anthropological evidence suggests that there are differences among contemporary communities in the degree and type of corruption from which the character of those communities suffers. It seems obvious to me that at least some of these differences affect what character traits
are redemptive for the members of the communities which so differ. Some
cultures, for whatever reason, are quite prone to addictive behavior.
Others seem to be relatively impervious to it. It seems to me that a severe
ascetic disposition would likely be redemptive for the members of the first
type of society whereas it might inhibit the appropriate appreciation of
God's good gifts in the second society. A vigilant wariness of relating with
members of the opposite sex would probably be redemptive in a society
utterly lacking in sexual restraint, whereas the same trait would likely limit
the degree to which people were able to love their neighbors in a society in
which chastity is successfully sustained by strong social influences and the
habituation that results from such influences. In each of these cases it
seems plausible to me to that there is a character trait that would be a
virtue in one of the societies that would be a vice in the other.
Not all of the relevant differences in character are differences among
communities. Differences within a society in the specific degree and type
of individual corruption affect what traits are virtues for the members of
that society. The sort of affectionate disposition toward children that
would morally improve the ability of most people to love children would
likely be a vice for a pedophile, since, combined with the other features of
his character, it would likely dispose him to the abuse of children.
Similarly, a billionaire who could not constructively aspire to the sort of
self-sacrificing love that Mother Teresa exhibited, would benefit from a relatively generous, but less sacrificial, disposition that would have been a
vice for Mother Teresa because it would have tended to make her life less
conformed to the love of God and others.
So, I suggest, while Christians have reasons to insist, with Nussbaum
and Aristotle, on the correctness "of a single objective account of the
human good, or human flourishing," they have reason to deny, with the
relativist opponents of Aristotle and Nussbaum, the correctness of a single
"list of virtues that will serve as normative for all ... societies."
Nussbaum's failure to recognize the possibility of such a position came, I
suggest, from the failure to recognize that the character traits of the good
human being can be different from the character traits that make a human
being good. That failure amounts to the failure to recognize that human
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character is, in various ways, so defective that the dispositions of the
morally ideal human being are beyond our capacities. Virtue is always, for
fallen human beings, redemptive in the sense that its making one good is a
matter of repairing the damage of sin to our character, or of counteracting
the effects of such damage on our actions.
TV. Redemptiveness and the Corrective Nature of Virtue

The recognition of the inevitably redemptive nature of virtue for fallen
humanity explains what is right about the claim of Philippa Foot and others that the virtues are "corrective." According to Foot, "[I]t is only
because fear and the desire for pleasure operate as temptations that
courage and temperance exist as virtues at all." Later she adds, "[T]here is,
for instance, a virtue of industriousness only because idleness is a temptation; and of humility only because men tend to think too well of themselves. Hope is a virtue [only] because despair too is a temptation."ll
Robert C. Roberts points out that these counterfactual claims are, in some
cases, false. He distinguishes between "virtues of will power," such as
courage, self-control and patience, and "substantive" or "motivational"
virtues, such as honesty, justice, generosity and gratitude. The latter virtues
are substantive because they are the "psychological embodiment of moral
rules-the substance of the ethical patterns of behavior and judgment and
emotion."!2 They are motivational in that they are a matter of having the
right set of motives, wanting the right things, taking satisfaction in the right
things, etc. Virtues of will power, on the other hand, do "not imply any
characteristically ethical patterns of behavior, judgment, and emotion.
Racists, cheats, sadists, and thieves may well be persevering, resolute, and
self-controlled ... "13 Foot's claims about the corrective nature of virtue
apply, according to Roberts, only to the virhles of will power:
If people were never led astray by fears and pleasures, it is plausible
that courage and self-control themselves would not arise. For courage
and self-control are the capacities to manage our inclinations, when
they are wayward, to flee dangers and seek pleasures ... [But]
Industriousness could exist in a world in which no one suffered from
laziness, and honesty in a world where no one lied-though it is likely
that in such a world these virtues would not be named or much
noticed. The substantive virtues are' corrective' in the trivial sense that
there are vices which correspond to them; the virtues of will power are
corrective in the significant sense that, in our present psychological
condition but not in every imaginable one, they are needed to keep us
on the path of virtue and our higher self-interest.!4

While Roberts is right that some virtues would exist even if no one were
tempted by the corresponding vice, appreciating the redemptiveness of
virtue enables us to see that all of the virtues are corrective in a sense deeper
than their mere opposition to vices. For fallen human beings, no character
trait is a virtue, tmless it is well suited to overcoming dispositions opposed to
the love of God and others, and the moral incapacities of our character.
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There are, moreover, not onJy virtues of will power, but also substantive
virhles, such as reciprocity, that are needed given a particular psychological
condition, but not given every imaginable one to keep people on the path of
virtue and [their] higher self-interest./I The issue of whether a trait would
serve that purpose in a human being without vice, is quite distinct from the
issue of whether, given our actual condition, it is needed to correct our inclination". The issue of whether a character trait can be put to immoral uses is
also distinct from the issue of whether it would be a trait of the human being
without vice. Although industriousness and loyalty would be virtues even
for those lacking the contrary inclinations, they too can enhance the work of
racists, cheats, sadists, and thieves. But that does not mean that they are
virtues which do "not imply any characteristically ethical patterns of behavior, judgment, or emotion." Courage, self-control, industriousness, and loyalty are virtues, and they can be exercised in the pursuit of theft. But, in the
thief, they are not virtues. The dispositions to pursue theft courageously
industriously, with self-control, etc., do not tend to improve the conformity
of the thief to the love of God and others. This is I think what is correct about
Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of the virtues. Character traits are not virtues
independently of their relations to the rest of one's character. The issue is not
however, as Aristotle thought, whether all of one's character traits are those
of a good person, i.e., the person in whom the human telos is fulfilled.
Whether a given character trait of a person is a virtue or not, depends rather
on whether combining it with her other character traits is a redemptive combination, i.e., whether it tends to improve her conformity to her telos.
The equivalence Robert" assumes between substantive virilles and those
one would have even if we had no contrary inclinations comes from a failure
to recognize that the substance of morality is itself affected by the limitations
of our psychological condition due to sin. What we ought to do, morally,
depends in part on what the limitations of our character are. His failure to
recognize that the character traits of the morally perfect person, such as
industriousness, could be vicious in those with character deficiencies is due
to his overlooking the effects of sin on the sort of life that would tend to
make us good. His failure to recognize the possibility that there could be
character traits, such as reciprocity, that are substantive virtues onJy because
of their corrective function is likewise due to a failure to appreciate the
redemptive nature of virille for fallen human beings. None of this undermines the claim that there is an important distinction between substantive or
motivational virilles and virtues of will power. But the degree to which, and
the sense in which, they are corrective are not differences between them.
/I

v. Two Objections
It might be objected that the example of the courageous thief is really best
thought of as a counter-example to my claim that virtue is a matter of
redemptiveness in the sense T intend. Although courage does, given a
thief's disposition to steal, tend to diminish the degree to which his life
conforms to the love of God and others, it might nevertheless be thought to
be a virtue. After all, vices are generally thought of as character traits of
which one ought to seek to rid oneself. But it seems that if we were to give
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the thief moral advice, we should advise him to seek to overcome his disposition to steal but not advise him to become cowardly. That would seem
to indicate that his disposition to steal is a vice but his courage is not. 15
My contention is that both the courage of the thief and his disposition to
steal are vices. These two traits form an unredemptive combination. But it
does not follow that all ways of eliminating it are equally good. There are
typically two possible ways of eliminating this unredemptive combination
in the thief's character: 1) eliminating his disposition to steal, or 2) eliminating his courage. Of these two, 1) is obviously a morally better strategy. To
be a courageous, honest person is obviously better conformed to the human
te/os than to be a cowardly thief. That a courageous thief is morally worse
than he would be if he were cowardly is typically irrelevant to the question
of how he ought to seek moral improvement. If for some reason, it were
possible for the thief to cultivate cowardice, but not possible to undermine
his disposition to steal/6 then he would be morally well advised to undertake such a course of action. Such advice would be similar to the sentiment
expressed by Jesus when he said, "If your hand causes you to sin, cut it off.
It is better for you to enter life maimed than with two hands to go into hell,
where the fire never goes OUt."F This is usually taken as a bit of hyperbole
on Jesus' part. The literal advice to amputate one's hand when it contributes to sin is hyperbolic. But the literal truth behind the hyperbole is
that one is morally better off without one's hand if its absence can eliminate
the means to sin. There are, of course, typically less drastic means of seeking to avoid sin. But if, for some reason, the amputation of a person's hand
really were the only means of eliminating some besetting sin,]8 then she
would be morally well-advised to seek the amputation. Hands can be very
good things if they are put to good use, but if they were unavoidably put
only or mostly to sinful use, we would be morally better off without them.
Similarly, courage can be a very good character trait if it is put to good use,
but if it were unavoidably used by a person only or mostly to steal effectively,
then he would be morally well advised to seek its elimination.
A second objection to the relativity of virtue of the sort for which I have
been arguing is that the "relative virtues" are really not virtues, but merely
traits that are prudentially useful for moral development.]9 Although the
traits in question are typically desirable in part because of their usefulness
for moral development, this objection misses the point that there is nothing
essentially developmental about their moral excellence. The relative generosity of the philanthropic billionaire might enable his further moral development. If he practiced the best balance of other-regarding and self-regarding
uses of his wealth to which he could constructively aspire, his character
might improve to the point at which he could constructively aspire to a higher standard- perhaps to the degree of self-sacrificial regard for others that
Mother Teresa exhibited. But that is only one of the ways that his relative
generosity would be redemptive for him. It increases the degree to which
his life is conformed to the love of others just by disposing him to serve others with his wealth more than he would otherwise be inclined to. Even if he
would not, by means of such habituation, become able to aspire constructively to a greater degree of self-sacrifice, his relative generosity would still
be a virtue for him because it would still be well suited to making him good.
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If he acts in accordance with it, he is doing just what he ought to do morally.
Given his character, he ought to mix his regard for himself with his regard
for others in the way that he does because to do so is the best way available
to him of improving the degree to which he serves others. That makes it
implausible to deny that this disposition would be a virtue for the billionaire
because it is not a trait he would have if he fulfilled his telos. Such a denial
implies that a trait disposing him to do just what he ought to do is not a
virtue and that doing what he ought to do is not an act of virtue. The objector could, of course, deny that one is ever obligated to do anything short of
what one would do if he fulfilled his telos. But it seems wholly implausible
to deny that one ought to undertake the most morally constructive strategy
of which one is capable. And I think I have the Christian Scriptures on my
side in this matter. The New Testament seems, as I have argued, to treat the
Old Testament Law as both an obligation of Israelites and as falling short of
what one would do if one loved God and others completely.

VI. Unfinished Business
I have been arguing that, since virtue is redemptive, it is relative to the specific degree and type of corruption from which the character of the relevant
individuals and communities suffer. Although it seems clear to me that the
character of the individual and that of the community are both relevant to
what is redemptive (and therefore virtuous) for the individual and the community, one job that remains to be done is to specify more clearly how individual and community redemptiveness relate to each other in the determination of character. Such a clarification will be made easier by the fact that
the love of others is a part of the te/os I have specified. Given that, any disposition of an individual that is redemptive for her community, will, all else
being equal, also be redemptive for that individual, since the life to which it
disposes him will thereby be better conformed to the love of others.
While I have said much about redemption as the transformation of our
character, I have said very little about the transformations of our character
due to the supernatural intervention of God in which the Christian faith
gives us reason believe. That is a job for another time. But when a
Christian understanding of supernatural redemption is integrated with
what I have been saying, I think it will give Christians, who believe that we
can benefit more fully from such redemption through faith in Christ, reason to hold ourselves to higher standards of virtue than those to which we
hold others. I think we will have reason to expect, not only a fuller development of the same virtues that we expect to see in others, but also the
development of virtues that we do not have reason to expect of others.

Messiah College
NOTES
1. Hereafter, I shall refer to such improvement as improvement in the
degree of our "conformity to the love of God and others."
2. This is not to deny that virtue would exist if it were not for human
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depravity. My claim is only that, given human depravity, character traits contribute to human fulfillment if and only if they enable us to overcome the
impediments of sin to our fulfillment.
3. "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach" in Ethical Theory:
Character and Virtue, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, eds. Peter A. French,
Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (South Bend, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 33.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 34.
6. Matt. 5:38-39 (NlV).
7. Matt. 5:44 (NIV).
8. "Nonresistance: A Just War Response," in War: Four Christian Views, ed.
Robert G. Clouse, 2nd. ed. (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1991) p.
66.
9. Jesus himself hints at just such an explanation for a similar discrepancy
between his teachings and that of the Torah on the issue of divorce, "Moses
permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard. But it
was not this way from the beginning." Matt. 19:8 (NIV).
10. Among the explanations for this that I regard as plausible given
Christian theology are (1) that God's past commands had their redemptive
effect on the people of God, (2) that the life and teachings of Jesus provided
inspiration for, and clarity about, unconditional love that enabled a stronger
disposition to love others unconditionally, (3) that the sort of community
which God intends for Christian believers socially reinforces the disposition to
love others unconditionally, and (4) that the enabling resources of the Holy
Spirit are more fully available to the believer due to the redemptive work of
Christ.
11. "Virtues and Vices," in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978) p. 9.
12. "Will Power and the Virtues," in Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life:
Introductory Readings in Ethics, eds. Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers, 3rd
ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993) p. 269.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. p. 273.
15. William Tolhurst raised such an objection in the discussion of an earlier
version of this paper.
16. It is not obvious that such a situation is psychologically possible.
17. Mark 9:43 (NIV).
18. It is not obvious that this could ever be the case.
19. Norman Wirzba raised such an objection in his response to an earlier
version of this paper presented at the Wheaton College Philosophy Conference
on October 31,1996.

